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By Robert Huesca
The Mexican nationalization of foreign oil holdings in 1938 unleashOOa torrent of
English-Ianguage propaganda in a battle for the support of American officials and public
opinion. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 100the fight in the comer of the foreign
operators with the publication of a series of news bulletins, pamphlets, and books often
touted as "a factual summary of the events" (Standard Oil 1938b: 1). The Mexican
govemment counterOOby publishing a variety of periodicals and economic documents and
by dispatching teams of officials, labor leaders, and academics to address U.S. audiences
in public forums.
Observers of the period from both the UnitOOStates and Mexico noted the fever
pitch of the propaganda and the media coverage that the expropriation generatOO.Mexican
representatives consistently decriOOthe disinformation campaign waged by Standard Oil
through the U.S. press and called on their govemment to act to reverse the damaging
effects (Beteta 1940e; Calderón 1938; Castillo Nájera, AGN 1938b; Hay 1938; Noriega
1938; Suárez 1940). Ambassador Josephus Daniels noted in his memoirs that the oil
companies "started to build propaganda fires under the [U.S.] govemment to compel a
return of the properties" (Daniel s 1947: 231), and a freelance writer criticizOOthe "intense
campaign which the oil companies carriOOout in the Mexican and foreign press and which
for sheer distortion of facts has probably never been equalled" (Millan 1939: 200). Yet the
New York Times, conveying oil company assertions, argued that the Mexican govemment
was not only propagating false information, but was also using that material to mislead
even its own people ("People of Mexico" 1938).
A survey of material s published by both sides in the oil debate reveals not so much
disinformation, as attempts to focus readers' attention on specific factors of the
expropriation by repeating certain images and omitting others. Furthermore, a limited
review of archival material sheds some light on Mexico's perception of the seriousness of
the oil company propaganda and exposes some of the motivations and actors on the part of
the govemment. Finally, an examination of U.S. newspapers provides a method of
assessing the ability of the Mexican govemment and the oil companies to influence
American editors. A study of propaganda effects on the U.S. press is important for any
analysis ofthe impact on American public policy, since entry into these publications would




For about two years after the Mexican oi! expropriation, Standard Oil regularly
published press releases, pamphlets, newsletters, appendices, magazines, and books
distributed at no charge "in the interest of an informed public." The pamphlets discussed
the company's history in Mexico, the legal basis of its operations, the country's record of
debt repayment, the issue of American rights abroad, and the indemnification process
(Standard 1938a and b, 1940a, b, and c). The five books and six appendices that Standard
published claimed to reflect the opinions of the average American, provided deeper
background on the day's issues, and dealt with law, the debt, and the State Department's
role in the expropriation.
Standard always elaimed to hold an objective position when presenting arguments
against the Mexican expropriation by reprinting artieles, editorials, and cartoons from the
world's press. In this way the company deemphasized its own vested interest in the
expropriation and pointed out that intemational opinion had ruled against the Mexican
action. Mexico at the Bar 01Public Opinion best exemplified this approach by reprinting
artieles and editorials from the United States and Latin America. In the book's preface,
author Burt McConnell wrote, "In no other nation could one find such a variety of able,
independent, and clearly written editorials on any public question" (McConnell1939: iii).
Yet readers found scant variety among the entries, which were in fact artiele excerpts rather
than editorials. And although the introduction claimed that artieles were selected in a
random fashion, the reprinted selections appeared to be handpicked diatribes against
Mexico. For example, the reporters most frequently selected were writers who disliked
Mexico's policy and wrote artieles reflective of their opinions. Frank L. Kluckhohn of the
New York Times and Henry J. Allen of the Topeka State Journal were the most frequentIy
reprinted writers, both being cited ten times in the book. After them, Betty Kirk of the
Christian Science Monitor and 1. H. Carmical of the New York Times were the next most
frequentIy cited writers. Both Kirk and Kluckhohn were correspondents in Mexico, and
their repeated inelusion is logical, if for no other reason than the high volume of copy they
produced. But Allen and Carmical were both working from their local bases and seem to
have been included simply because of the acerbic tone of their articles on Mexico.
Furthermore, prolific writers in the field like Upton Close, who wrote for the Sto Louis
Post-Dispatch, the Washington Evening Star, and other newspapers, and Anita Brenner,
who wrote for the Milwaukee Journal, were virtually ignored, being cited only once each,
and in short fragments. Both Close and Brenner wrote more in-depth pieces that tended to
expose information unfavorable to the oi! companies and sympathetic to Mexico.
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In addition to reprinting artic1es of the period, Mexico at the Bar 01Public Opinion
inc1uded forty editorial cartoons from newspapers throughout the United States. The
drawings invariably, and predictably, invoked images of the stock Mexican: the stout,
mustachioed tobacco fiend, with a towering Emiliano Zapata sombrero, and broken shoes,
huarache sandals, or bare feet. As the images of the Mexican were limited, so too were the
themes pursued by cartoonists. More than half of the drawings conveyed the message that
the oil expropriation amounted to nothing less than thievery and an opportunity seized by
the Mexicans to insult the gringos. In the same vein, the seizure was depicted as a
convenient maneuver undertaken by a slothful government. American cartoonists also
highlighted the Good Neighbor Policy and the accornmodating attitude of Unc1e Sam. In
this scenario, Mexicans played the role of subversives, actively working to thwart U.S.
accornmodation. Another set of cartoons reflected the position that Mexico itself was the
true victim of the expropriation, an assertion repeatedly made in newspaper editorials at the
time. Afear mentioned regularly in diplomatic circ1esand in the press, Nazi and cornmunist
influence in Mexico, made only token appearances in the cartoons reproduced by Standard
Oil. But an interesting nuance of many of the cartoons was the manner in which they
viewed the Mexican action as an affront to American interests in general, rather than a
injustice against the oil companies in particular. Oíl companies in the United States had
received a good deal of bad press because of their perceived greed, allegedly unethical
dealings with labor, and product sales to the Axis powers. Cartoonists may have attempted
to distance themselves from the oil companies by broadening the issues in U.S.-Mexican
relations. This tactic, however, benefited Standard Oil, which relentlessly denied charges
of recalcitrance and eagerly pointed to other industries that were experiencing difficulties
with the Mexican government.
Using the same tactic of tapping non-Standard Oil news sources, the company
published, in both Spanish and English, a monthly broadsheet with the claim, "The
material herein has been taken from published sources and is reproduced without cornment"
(Standard 1939b). Looking at Mexico . .. or De Cómo Ven a Méjico . .. did, in fact,
present views from numerous locations and publications, but limited its content to stories
that reflected unfavorably on Mexico (Standard 1938c, 1939b). Articles reprinted from
newspapers like the Wall Street Journal, the New York Herald Tribune, the Danville (Va.)
Bee, the Topeka Capital, Excélsior, El Universal, and La Prensa may have conveyed a
sense of legitimacy and impartiality to the Standard Oíl propaganda campaign, especially
since many of the charges in the stories could not be refuted. In fact, artic1es that asserted
that Standard had provided housing, education, water, and electricity to its workers, who
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were the highest wage eamers in Mexico, were corroborated by some Mexican sources of
the period (Bosques 1937; Compañía n.d.; Mexico 1940).
Less evenhanded than the news monthly and the bound anthology of editorial
opinion by McConnell was another series published by Standard. On these readings alone
Standard appears as the benevolent foreign investor lured into the swampy back1ands of
Mexico, on1y to be betrayed by a govemment fully informed of the company's mission
from the outset.
Discovery and development of the known oil fields in Mexico were the
achievement of British and American pioneers, who carne in10this regíon at a time
when it was a little-known, pest-infested, tropical wildemess. They carne at the
express invitation of the Mexican govemment for the specific purpose of trying to
find and to develop oil fields. (Standard 1938a: 1)
Once it had struck oil, Standard took the lead in providing the highest wage scale and most
comprehensive package of benefits in Mexico.
It fumished free housing, free fuel and light, medical and hospital care for the
worker and his entire family, free transponation, education and recreation
facilities, plus contributions 10savings funds and other benefits. (Standard 1938b:
1)
In the most drarnatic of all its parnphlets, Standard ponrayed the Mexicans as lacking the
entrepreneurial spirit characteristic of the American oil men. In fact, the Mexicans appear
little more than opportunistic manipulators.
For several years the Mexicans watched these Americans going into unhealthy
jungles and drilling wells which produced little or no oil. The Mexican attitude was
one of incredulity and indifference . .. As soon as it becarne apparent, however,
that the Americans had struck oil in a big way, the incredulity of the Mexican
politicians gave way to envy, and the indifference wastransmutted (sic) into
cupidity. The temptation to appropriate what foreign ingenuity, energy and capital
were developing in Mexico proved irresistible. Slowly but surely the Mexican
Govemment reached out its fmgers and began to squeeze. (Standard 1940b: 1-2)
One of the more substantive topics written up by Standard concemed Mexico's
inability to fulfill indemnification payments and the country's poor record on settling its
former debts, particularly those resulting from the massive land reform (Standard 1940a).
"Mexico's long record of default" totaled $493 million, Standard c1aimed. In addition,
bonded indebtedness totaled $976 million, most of which had been in default since 1919.
Although the parnphlets never suggested that the United States dispatch the marines, they
did advance veiled threats, and certainly urged increased pressure from the State
Department (Standard 1939a). This tactic was probably counterproductive, as Cárdenas
reacted strongly against the oil companies' petitions to U.S. representatives (Townsend
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1952). A1though the pamphlets all foeused on a speeifie topie, they all shared the
underlying theme that the expropriated properties should be retumed to private hands.
Mexican Publications
Prior to the oil expropriation, Mexieo had already ereated the infrastrueture for an
English-Ianguage propaganda network. In Deeember 1936, President Cárdenas initiated the
Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP) as part of his "sales eampaign on
behalf of the Six-Year-Plan, blueprint of his administration" (plenn 1939: 28). The DAPP
operated out of the Foreign Relations Seeretariat and funetioned as the government's
official press offiee, handling both foreign and domestie news inquiries. Shortly after the
expropriation, the DAPP eoordinated alllegal and politieal"informaciones" regarding oil,
and Cárdenas instrueted the entire Mexiean diplomatie eorps to ehannel all propaganda
eomplaints and suggestions to it (Hidalgo 1938).
A1though the Mexican Congress officially created the DAPP in late 1936, it had
aetualIy been publishing books and periodieals sinee 1934. Most of its editorial activity had
been in Spanish during this period, but it also published a weekly, four-page document of
government news ealled the Weekly News Sheet. Furthermore, it published a book, Guide
to the History oi Mexico by Alfonso Teja Zabre, whieh it distributed fn;e with the
eondition, "If you like it and want to keep it, send remittanee, if not, return the book"
(Advertisement, Weekly News, 1935: 4). The Weekly News Sheet routinely earried
declarations from and reports on the various ministries in the government. In addition, the
bulletin periodieally earried essays on socialist edueation, agrarian reform, and other social
welfare programs. Oceasionally, the sheets provided official govemment statisties that may
have been useful to foreign eorrespondents, the targets of the publieation. But more
frequentIy, the pages were crowded with platitudes.
After the oil nationalization, Mexieo's ineipient propaganda maehine gained
momentum rapidly. The most regular publieation during this period was the Mexican Labor
News, an 8 112by 11 ineh weekly, published by the Workers University of Mexieo, and
distributed to 4,000 individual s and organizations abroad for a one-dollar annual
subseription fee. In the months prior to the expropriation, reporting in the labor publieation
focused on the legal dispute and its techniealities and on the obstinacy of the oil eompanies.
In general, these articles ehronicled the legal phases of the appeals process in the Mexiean
eourts and also reported on aetions taken by government and labor offieials ("Mission of
Dil," "Dil Companies Refuse," "Dil Fight Taeties," "Dil Situation Marks," "Supreme Court
Upholds," 1938).
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The Mexicans frequentIy reported on their ability to ron the oil industry in the event
that the foreign companies abandoned the country. And the newspaper continually
reassured its readers that the nation would not be adversely affected by an oil company
pullout. These declarations may have had two functions: to avert public panic if and when
the industry were nationalized, and to maintain pressure on the oil giants. In fact, labor
leaders like Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of the Confederation of Mexican Workers
(CTM), spoke of the expropriation of foreign operations as inevitable, according to his
declarations published in Mexican Labor News.
After the government expropriated the foreign holdings, the oil issue appeared on
the pages of Mexican Labor News more regularly, and the focus of the coverage shifted
from legal aspects to issues of imperialism, national sovereignty and economic well-being,
oil company cooperation, and international support. Mexico emphasized that the principIes
of national sovereignty, which had been recognized internationally, permitted the
government to expropriate the properties and to settle indemnification terms in its own
courts. President Lázaro Cárdenas told an audience in Sinaloa, "'We have the right to
defend our sovereignty and," the President added, "in this matter, fortunately, it has
received the juridical recognition of all the countries of the world" ("Mexico Will Not"
1939). And the newspaper repeatedly parroted labor's assertions that the oil companies
were mere agents of imperialism ("Oil Workers Confident" 1939, "CTM Condemns Anti-
Labor Meddling" 1941). Often, messages of economic health and freedom accompanied
anti-imperialist themes. On the first anniversary of the expropriation, Cárdenas called the
action "historie, affmning the economic and political stability of Mexico" ("Labor Groups
Lead" 1939). This message continued to the second anniversary celebration where the
masses "paraded through the streets with cheers and music and with banners that
proclaimed: 'The Wealth of Mexico Must Be Possessed by Mexico!'" ("Mexico Celebrates
Second" 1940). Finally, Mexican Labor News optimistically reported on negotiations with
the oil companies and stressed the likelihood of compromise and a fmal solution throughout
1939 and 1940. This approach caused some uneasiness among labor leaders in Mexico, but
was probably in the nation's best interest abroad, as it gave the appearance that the
Mexicans were willingly and actively participating in negotiations. Since the labor
publication was officially sanctioned, liberal s in the United States could theoretically
display the newspaper as informal evidence of Mexican policy, and thereby combat U.S.
hard-liners urging a more punitive position from the State Department.
Apart from Mexican Labor News, the government's most elaborate project was the
publication of Mexico's Oi/, a gargantuan 881-page translation of the report (originally
2,700 pages) prepared by the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration in August 1937
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(Hamilton 1982). The report appeared to be a solid work documenting the details of the
economic and social situation of the oil companies and their employees. For example, the
book convincingly demonstrated that foreign workers in Mexico earned substantia1ly more
than the native Mexican laborers who virtually could not work up to managerial positions.
Furthermore, it showed that foreign companies paid their Mexican laborers three to four
times less money than their U.S. workers performing comparable services.
Whereas much of the information reflected negatively on the foreign companies,
many of the details tended to support the position of the oil companies. For instance, the
book pointed out that the oil companies complied with federal housing laws and provided
workers with residences that the report qualified as in good condition. It also reported that
the companies provided their workers' children with schools, which had adequate water
and sanitary services. Only about half of the c1assrooms contained desks and chairs,
however, and the student-teacher ratio was forty-eight to one. Finally, some of the details
of the government's award to workers, such as a 42,OOO-pesofund for hiring bands, did
appear removed from the issues of wages, benefits, and working conditions.
The only other English-Ianguage publication initiated by the Mexican government
during this period was a monthly, 16-page magazine called Mexico News. Beginning in
1941, the magazine was issued free by the "Bureau of International News Service
Department of State for Foreign Mfairs." The publication acted as a document of record to
a large degree, reprinting political speeches and focusing on government reports. Very few
of the artic1es dealt with petroleum, and those that did provided production statistics in a
straightforward and largely uncontentious manner.
Mexican Actors
Although the oil crisis accelerated the generation of English-Ianguage propaganda,
Mexican leaders had previously acknowledged the need to present their version of events
directly to the North American audience and were acutely sensitive to criticisms from
outside the country. This sensitivity was certainly present at the inception of the Cárdenas
administration and was reflected through the press office of the official party (all block
quotations of primary documents appear in their original English or Spanish).
When I was chosen Secretary of Press and Propaganda in the National Executive
Committee of the National Revolutionary Party conc1usive evidence was brought
to my attention that agencies of several kinds were busy beyond our frontiers
spreading misinformation about Mexico in general and the Party in particular.
Therefore I suggested, and the Committee approved, the creation of an information
bureau at the service of the foreign press and of foreign students of Mexican
development. (Bosques 1937: ix)
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The PNR's early press office shared many of the same strategies and techniques of the
government's DAPP with which it fully cooperated in some propaganda efforts (Hay
1936a). Documents in the Mexican archives provide further evidence of how the
government perceived foreign propaganda, which agents played key roles in the strategy to
influence U.S. opinion, and what options were proposed and acted on by the
administration.
Like the PNR's press office, the government's public relations department
expressed concern regarding U.S. opinion long before the oil expropriation, and took
action to evaluate and counter adverse foreign reports. During 1936, a steady flow of
articles reached Cárdenas from a clipping service in the United States (Corresponsales
1936). These files inc1uded reports from all regions of the nation in large and small
newspapers such as the Rosicrucian Digest, Whittier (Ca.) News, New York Daily News,
El Paso Times, Christian Science Monitor, and the Breeze-Courier (Taylorville, Ill.)
(ibid.). These early evaluations must have proved dissatisfactory as Mexico moved quickly
to combat unfavorable reports, using a strategy of delivering its message directIy to the
American audience.
In October 1936, for example, the government arranged to have an early speech by
Cárdenas transmitted on shortwave radio, "a fm de que sea escuchado en las dos Américas"
(Hay 1936b). Furthermore, a three-minute segment was to be translated into English and
transmitted on the NBC radio network (ibid.). The Mexican embassy in Washington
functioned as an active, central station for efforts to reach the U.S. publico By early 1936,
the embassy had compiled a list of 10,000 names that it believed would greatIy benefit the
image of Mexico in the United States.
El fichero en cuestión fué (sic) preparado por nosotros con todo cuidado y nos ha
sido extremadamente útil en Washington para contrarrestar, como se ha podido, la
inaúdita campaña católica anti-mexicana . . . En estos días vamos a remitir a la
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores unas quinientas fichas más de "Amigos de
Mexico. "1
Upon reaching Mexico, the list of names was regularly used for sending materials
produced by the secretariat's publicity department (Hay 1936a).
Although the interest in foreign news was established by early 1936, Mexican
activity in this area increased dramatically after the oil nationalization. Ambassador Castillo
Nájera corresponded regularly, sometimes on a daily basis, with President Cárdenas
regarding how Mexican events were portrayed in the United States (Castillo Nájera, AGN
1 Luis Quintanilla, letter from the chargé d'affaires (encargado de negocios) in the Washington embassy to
Cárdenas, February 15, 1936.
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Washington embassy, many officials and writers had requested copies of the document
(Hay 1938). Although the translation of the findings was not completed until 1940, it is
clear that the project was given a top priority within the DAPP (Arroyo Ch. 1938).
Mexican efforts to combat negative images in the United States continued until the
eventual setdement, but no new major projects were initiated. Rather, the government acted
in an ad hoc manner, taking advantage of situations as they occurred. For example, the
Mexican Supreme Court's denial of a Standard Oíl injunction, or amparo, appeal was
immediately translated into English, printed in pamphlet form, and distributed to all
Mexican consulates for press dissemination (Various 1939). In another instance, the
government reprinted and issued in the United States 10,000 copies of a speech made in
Austin, Texas, by Sinc1air Oil's lawyer lauding a financial settlement between Mexico and
the company (Leñero, 1940). This decision was specificalIy approved by Cárdenas (ibid.).
In addition to generating and reproducing favorable propaganda, the Mexican
government moved to restrict negative reports regarding the oil question, though this action
was the exception rather than the rule. In fact, the only case of expulsion of a foreign
correspondent under Artic1e 33 involved Frank Kluckhohn of the New York Times.
KIuckhohn, who had also been ejected from Spain as a correspondent, virulently opposed
the expropriation, and personally believed the American government should have pressured
Mexico to return the properties to the oi! companies (Ickes 1954: 604). His writings
contained virtual ridicule of Cárdenas and displayed absolute certainty of the failure of the
government's reformist policies.
Entre tanto [Cárdenas es] un líder indio-mexicano con algunas gotas de sangre
española en sus venas trata de forjar la nación en un nuevo molde utilizando para el
objeto herramientas poco usuales y un yunque no muy firme. . .
Hoy en día, a pesar de la expropiación de las propiedades petroleras, de los
ferrocarriles y de la tierra, no obstante las múltiples frases henchidas de
pensamientos elevados que fueron difundidas por el México oficial, existe poca
diferencia entre el nivel de la pobreza general de ahora comparado con el de 1910.
México está regido por una tiranía sutil, que por eso no es menos real.5
Pressures on Cárdenas to expel KIuckhohn appear to have come from various sources.
Enrique Gutmann, editor of Editorial Masas, sent the president a full translated version of
KIuckhohn's still unpublished book, The Mexican Challenge, and for eight months sought
an emergency conference with Cárdenas on matters of "national and international
importance" (Gutmann 1938). Cárdenas repeated1y canceled without notice appointments to
see Gutmann and may never have met with him. But representatives from the DAPP also
5 "Expulsiones" file contained the unpublished manuscript of El reto mexicano by Frank L. KIuckhohn, no
date, pp. 1 and 3.
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complained that Kluckhohn chronically and "maliciously misinterpreted" Mexican policies
(Plenn 1939: 337). In mid-January 1939, Kluckhohn was ordered out of Mexico, "a
marked departure from the usual Cardenas policy on the press" (ibid.).
A final tactic employed by the Mexican government to shape public opinion in the
United States was to dispatch officials, socialleaders, and academics who would defend
the government's position before conferences, meetings, and university audiences. A fluny
of such activity took place in the spring of 1940, when a team of Mexican politicalleaders
and diplomats traveled to Washington to attend the American Scientific Congress. CfM
leader Lombardo Toledano traveled across the United States and spoke to audiences at the
Foreign Policy Association, the International Institute of Industrial Relations, the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). During
that trip he held 52 press conferences in defense of Mexico's image, emphasizing the
struggle against fascism (Lombardo Toledano 1978: 131).
Hablé, supuesto que era el tema, de esto: "¿Tienen los trabajadores de México y de
los Estados Unidos una tarea común?" Hablé de esta tarea común y dije en síntesis:
el facismo sólo puede triunfar a condición de transformarse en un régimen
universal de gobierno... la tendencia es quitar mercados a los Estados Unidos,
ganar influencia política ante los gobiernos latinoamericanos, influir en la
educación cultural de sus pueblos, para aislar a los Estados Unidos... el fascismo
nos entregaba una tarea común: combatirlo hasta exterminarlo en América yen el
mundo entero. (Ibid.: 129-130)
Other appeals for travel funding, which Cárdenas eventually granted, indicate broad
interest among leftists to serve as government image builders.
Es una brillante oportunidad y una gran tribuna para hacer la defensa de
México, y en particular de su postura revolucionaria frente a la Empresas petroleras
y el Derecho Internacional. EL FRENTE [Socialista de Abogados] cuenta con
destacados intelectuales como Mario Sausa, González Aparicio, y otros para
desempeñar un papel brillante en la defensa del Cardenismo en la misma Capital
Norteamericana. Pretende luego enviar una brigada de oradores a todas las
regiones de este Continente con iguales finalidades. Por el momento y con la
urgencia del caso, necesita la ayuda del Gobierno para pagar los gastos de viaje de
los o del delegado que irá a la Capital de Norte América.6
Although Rincón appears to haven taken the initiative in sending a delegation to
Washington, he was actually following the lead of the President. Earlier that month,
Cárdenas summoned Ramón Beteta, subsecretary of foreign relations, from repatriation
tasks on the Texas border to an emergency meeting in Acapulco (Cárdenas, AGN 1940a).
The substance of their meeting is not known, but Beteta immediately set out for
6 Valentín Rincón, letter from Mexico City lawyer lOCárdenas, Apri122, 1940.
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Washington and New York, where, for two weeks, he met privately with U.S. diplomats
and participated in public forums. His detailed and confidential accounts filed regularly to
Cárdenas indicated that he was following explicit orders from the president
Beteta's correspondence demonstrated incisive understanding of the U.S. press,
discerning analysis of his government's situation and options, and an ambiguous
transformation as between his early and final assessments of the most fruitful courses of
action available to Mexico. Beteta understood that American editors measured drama to
determine news value, and he specifically loaded his addresses with controversial
statements to exploit that principIe. He rationalized his tactic with Cárdenas, stating, "No
obstante los riesgos que esto implica, creo que es conveniente que hable yo, pues es la
única manera de 'crear noticias' sobre México que de otro modo, los periódicos no
publican" (Beteta 1940a).
Before making his address, however, Beteta met with a number of poli tical and
labor leaders informally, and discovered an underlying sympathy for the Mexican position.
At an informal dinner with John C. Collier (Department of Indian Affairs), Harold Ickes
(secretary of the interior), Henry Wallace (secretary of agriculture), J. Chapman
(subsecretary of agriculture), James Young (Department of Foreign Trade), Felix
Frankfurter (Supreme Court justice), and Lee Pressman of the CID, Beteta had an
opportunity to meet privately with various leaders and talkindepth on the U.S. position on
the oil crisis (Beteta 1940b). Specifically on the exprop'riation, Beteta optimistically wrote
to Cárdenas, "Tengo el agrado de comunicar a usted que la opinión unánime de las
personas presentes fue en el sentido de que México tenía razón" (ibid.). And if his account
was indeed accurate, prominent U.S. officials demonstrated unwavering assurance to
Mexico.
El secretario de Gobernación, Sr. Ickes, dijo entonces "nosotros no vamos a ir a
México a ayudar a las compañías a que vuelvan a tomar posesión de sus
propiedades." Contesté que así lo esperábamos nosotros, pero que el solo temor
del pueblo de que sí lo hicieran, temor que estaba explicado en vista del tono y el
tiempo en que se mandó la última nota americana, era suficiente para tener
repercusiones políticas en México. (!bid.)
Beteta received similar reassurances from other administration officials; nevertheless, he
remained somewhat preoccupied with Mexico's image in the press (Beteta 194Od). Of a
public address he made at the Town Hall Club of New York, Beteta wrote that he was
satisfied with the results, but dubious about receiving a fair trial in the press.
Aunque no me toca a mi calificar el resultado, creo que la conferencia fué un éxito;
las preguntas que al final de élla me hicieron fueron fácilmente contestadas. Sin
embargo, vamos a ver cómo toma la prensa el asunto. No me extrañaría que
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alguno de los periodistas presentes tergiversaran alguna frase o mal interpretaran
algún concepto. (Beteta 194Oc)
In response, he suggested that Mexico mount a press offensive in the United States,
making use of the contacts he developed on his brief tour. Details of his proposal are not
known, but it may have included making use of an afternoon newspaper in New York,
P.M., whose editor, Kenneth Crawford, had offered Beteta assistance during an informal
social evento
Como resultado de mi conversación con el Sr. Crawford, convenimos en que
procurará usar su influencia para, en 10 posible disminuir la campaña contra
nuestro país.. .. Esta puede ser una oportunidad verdaderamente extraordinaria que
creo debemos aprovechar como parte del programa que mas tarde habré de
proponer a usted sobre el problema de la publicidad de este país. (Beteta 1940b)
Cárdenas offered full support to Beteta, who then met with New York publicity
agents in search of a counteroffensive strategy (Cárdenas, AGN 1940b). This crash course
on the U.S. media helped Beteta to refine the issues involved in Mexico's image problem,
to understand better the structure of news enterprises, and to adjust his strategy in
approaching the oil conflicto For example, conversations with representatives from the
travel business revealed that Mexico suffered from an image of instability that had severe
effects on its tourism industry (Beteta 1940e).
These interviews highlighted the linkages among oil company propaganda, media
coverage, and the level of tourism, but they also emphasized the structural difficulties of
manipulating the press.
Mientras más me adentro en el problema de publicidad, más me doy cuenta de sus
dificultades, en vista de la organización pre-establecida que cierra todos los canales
a quien los grandes intereses desean perjudicar. Creo, sin embargo, que no es
imposible llegar a tener los medios de una publicidad efectiva, siempre que se
conozca en detalle la organización de los periódicos y revistas, las conexiones que
tienen con las agencias de noticias, como la "United Press" y la "Associated Press"
y el funcionamiento de unos y otros organismos. (lbid.)
By the end of his interviews, Beteta seemed to have shifted his strategy away from the
press and more toward potential allies within the U.S. administration.
Creo que estamos en un momento crítico en el que pueden componerse o
descomponerse mucho en las próximas semanas. Si aprovechando la opinión del
primer grupo que es la del Gobierno, y el que está más cerca de ser amigo nuestro
y de comprender 10que puede representar, en un caso dado, la amistad de México,
podemos convencerlo de que le es más conveniente e inclusive más cómodo y más
barato a los Estados Unidos ayudamos en esta lucha contra las compañías
petroleras, que seguir haciendo presión sobre nuestro Gobierno para que sea él
quién ceda, con 10 cual sólo consigue enajenarse la buena voluntad de nuestro
pueblo. (Ibid.)
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Nevertheless, Beteta's conviction that Mexico needed to initiate a program of molding
public opinion remained solido He wrote to Cárdenas, "Si las compañías [petroleras]
lograran convencer a la opinión pública de este país de que México constituye un peligro
para su seguridad, estaríamos expuestos a cualquier atropello" (ibid). As previously stated,
the details of Beteta's plan are unelear, but evidence suggests that Cárdenas approved of an
immediate $10,000 disbursement to a New York publicity agent to begin combating
Mexico's negative image in the United States (Asociación 1940).
Whereas the Cárdenas administration expressed concern about the media problem in
the United States, it was clearly not obsessed with combating negative images at any costo
Both Mexicans and Americans advanced dozens of suggestions on how the government
should present its case in the United States; the majority received grateful replies and were
quickly forgotten. Many of the plans were quite detailed and in advanced stages of
planning, and one had even been cornmissioned by Cárdenas shortly after taking office.
For example, a group called the "Comisión de Estudios" developed a publicity campaign to
be directed by the oil workers union (Calderón 1938). The Comisión had defined the areas
where publicity was needed and had assigned artieles to its team of writers. Another
suggestion, typical of foreign mail received during the period, proposed to network the
Mexican view across the United States (Noriega 1938). Los Angeles joumalist Gordon
L'Allemand offered to coordina te Mexican propaganda through radio KFVD in Southern
California and Cornmunist party newspapers in Chicago, San Francisco, and New York.
Neither of these efforts ever got off the ground.
Measuring the Spillover
Effects of the Propaganda Efforts
In their efforts to shape public opinion, both the Mexican government and Standard
Oil hoped to provoke spillover effects in other publications. An examination of newspaper
artieles and editorial s in two regions of the United States provides a limited media sample
with which to assess the success of the various propaganda efforts.
Editorials in the New York Times overwhelmingly sided with the oil companies
throughout the conflict, and its immediate comment on the crisis elaimed, "Mexico
Defeating Itself." The Times repeated this point of view whereby Mexico was seen as the
true victim of its actions because of the irnmediate decrease in revenues and subsequent
deterioration of the economy (ibid., "Problem in Mexico" 1938; "Labor in Mexico" 1940).
Almost all the editorials started with the observation, which paralleled the U.S.
government's position, that Mexico indeed had the right to expropriate foreign oil holdings,
but that expropriation should have been followed up with "adequate, effective and prompt
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payment for the properties seized" ("Mexican Oil Problem" 1939). They then continued to
recommend punitive action against Mexico, or to direct demands for a return of the
properties. The most frequent action suggested in the Times was the cancellation of silver
purchases from Mexico ("Note to Mexico" 1940a and b; "No Mexican Arbitration" 1940).
The editors argued that the United States had no need for silver, which they contended was
being sold at artificially high prices and which subsidized the defiant behavior of the
Mexicans ("Note to Mexico" 1940b). Furthermore, they said, the accommodating attitude
of the State Department should be abandoned in favor of a more aggressive position that
would set an example for other countries in a position similar to that of the Mexicans
("Problem in Mexico" 1938).
For if Mexico is establishing a precedent by taking possession of foreign holdings,
so are we by the attitude we assume toward this policy. If by the modem
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which we call the Good Neighbor Policy,
this Govemment claims a protective interest in the relations of the nations of this
hemisphere with the rest of the world as Mexico's friend and neighbor, it is our
responsibility to give a wise and fmn directive to a course which greatly affects our
own intemational interests and relations. (Ibid.)
After more than ayear of fruitless negotiations, the Times maintained its position and went
on to suggest renewed govemment pressure for the restoration of the properties ("Mexican
Oil Problem" 1939).
And if the State Department becomes convinced that the Mexican Govemment is
not in position to make this "adequate and effective compensation," then its only
realistic course is to insist on the return of the properties to their American owners.
(Ibid.)
Up to the eve of a final settlement, Times editors maintained their position of
nonnegotiation ("Bargain with Mexico?" 1941). They opposed Treasury Department and
Import-Export Bank loans to Mexico rumored to coincide with payments to expropriated oil
companies: "It would be unwise for the United States to display an easy tolerance for
broken contracts" (ibid.).
The Times viewed Mexico as singularly responsible for evading a settlement with
the oil companies by refusing to submit the case to intemational arbitration ("Mexican
Reply" 1938).
The position which president Cardenas has taken cannot fail to sharpen the
disagreement prevailing between his country and our own. It jeopardizes not only
the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, but the economic position of
Mexico itself. (!bid.)
The editors also viewed as unscrupulous the oil barter deal between "socialistic Mexico and
totalitarian Germany" ("Profit Motive" 1938). The editorial promised to reserve judgment
16
on Mexico's decision, but concluded, "History, in fact, knows races and colors which
have lifted themselves out of servitude with the aid of arms soId by a greedy munition
merchant at a fancy price." The only shift in the Times' position appeared after Cárdenas
left office ("Change in Mexico" 1941). The newspaper noted a more hospitable attitude in
Mexico, especially concerning offers advanced by Interior Secretary Miguel Alemán. It
coneluded that the Mexican shift occurred naturally as a reflection of the failure of the
socialist experiment under Cárdenas and the realization of the dangers of a Nazi victory.
The Times' editorial opposition to Mexico coincided with negative news coverage
in general throughout the final years of the Cárdenas administration. News elips regularly
filed by the embassy in Washington rarely displayed artieles favorable to Mexico. But a
one-month survey of two newspapers reveals marked differences in reporting angles and in
the influence of Standard Gil.
During March 1938, the New York Times printed 32 expropriation stories, 10 of
them on page 1, and the San Antonio Express published 29 artieles, 1 of them on page 1.
The Times had its own correspondent in Mexico City, while the Express relied on news
from the Associated Press (AP) or the United Press (UP). Facts surrounding the
expropriation-the number and value of the companies affected, the disputed wage
increase--coincided for the most part in both newspapers' reporting. The slant of stories,
however, tended to vary to a great degree. Stories in the New York Times provided
consistent coverage of oil company statements in cornmunicating the expropriation story,
but only rarely bothered to balance articles with a response from the Mexicans. Reliance on
oil company sources was a trend established early in the Times' coverage of the petroleum
conflict, and intensified after actual expropriation.
As early as August 1937, the Times had reproduced oil company press releases
that tended to cast the industry in a benevolent light, while characterizing the workers as
unreasonable money grubbers. A typical story lead read:
United States and British petroleum companies operating in Mexico in a public
statement today characterized as "grossly unfair and misleading" the
recornmendations issued last night by the Government investigating committee that
the wages of the 18,000 oil workers should be raised $7,000,000 annually. The
Government intervened two months ago to settle a nation-wide oil strike after the
workers had refused to accept a nearly $2,800,000 or 33 per cent annual pay
increase offered by the companies. (Kluckhohn 1937a)
This event could have been seen from a variety of perspectives, but the Times consistently
chose to portray the occurrence as a case of workers refusing an oil company offer. Most
Times stories reproduced charges made by oil company officials without providing the
perspective of the government or of labor leaders.
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The Times not only displayed workers and the government as unreasonable, but
also portrayed the oil industry as unable to meet the financia! demands resulting from
official arbitration. This vision was made possible by relying on certain infonnation and
ignoring other documents. On one of the many wage deadlines, the Times wrote:
The oil companies have contended not only that they are unable to pay wage
increases of one-third the worker's salaries, but also that the system of operations
established by the government's decision is for them impossible. (Kluckhohn
1937b)
This artic1e not only contradicts the previously reported offer, but is even more reliant on
oil company sources, a trend that continued up to and after the March expropriation. Of the
story's eleven paragraphs, three directly quoted an oil company statement. The story began
on page 1 and eventually paraphrased a labor source, but not until the ninth paragraph on
page 4. "The workers contend that the government after months of investigation held the
companies were capable of paying" (Kluckhohn 1937b).
When the Times did provide some visibility to the Mexicans, it carne in stories
tangential to the oil expropriation and at the bottom of artic1es. In a nineteen-paragraph
story describing the mass parades in Mexico following the expropriation, President Lázaro
Cárdenas' speech was quoted for an unprecedented seven paragraphs (Kluckhohn 1938h).
Although the story began on page 1, all but one of Cárdenas' statements appeared on the
jump to page 14. This long quote was probably permissible because the story discussed
only the parade and did not delve into the oil question.
By contrast, the AP and UP's coverage in the San Antonio Express, while not pro-
Mexico, tended at least to give a hearing to labor and government. In a story regarding a
denial of an injunction filed by oil companies, the reporter described the ruling and then
quoted Judge Manuel Bartlett to explain bis findings (UP 1938a). The five-paragraph story
quoted no oil company sources, and drew on Judge Bartlett only in the fourth paragraph.
In the Times, however, a four-paragraph artic1e described the court denial and then called
on British representatives to explain their unmet needs and financiallimitations ("Foreign
Oil Firms" 1938).
Even after the expropriation, the Express tended to provide wider coverage to a
variety of Mexican officials in stories that were not necessarily favorable. With the headline
"Mexico Moving toward Inflation," the Express story quoted "bankers" and Eduardo
Suárez to explain the impact of the expropriation on the economy (AP 1938c). In the same
story, the reporter drew a conc1usion far different from the Times' writer regarding the
blame for the conflicto "It was the refusal of the British and American petroleum companies
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to put these [wage] increases into effect which 100 to expropriation of their properties"
(ibid. ).
Both newspapers devoted the largest number of their stories in March 1938 to
examining the effects of the expropriation on gas and oil production, and on the economy
overall. The New York Times saw the impact of the expropriation and the announcement of
discontinuOO silver purchases from the UnitOOStates as being disastrous to the Mexican
economy, leading to a state of chaos throughout the country. "Mexico, which was ayear
ago enjoying a boom, was faced with the most serious crisis in years as the result of the
campaign against foreign industry" (Kluckhohn 1938d). By expropriating the industry,
Mexico had also increasOOworker expectations beyond its capability to control labor.
The question taking fmner shape in many minds here, however, is whether in
the long ron President Lazaro Cardenas can control other labor elements, now that
he has turnOOthe vast petroleum industry over to the workers. Where the radical
course of this southern neighbor of the United States is going to terminate lies in
the answer to this question, and the answer appears more important to some
observers than the irnmediate results of President Cardenas' expropriation of the
oil companies, which is vitally affecting trade and the national economy.
(Kluckhohn 1938g)
With oil production inaccurately reported as down by 85 percent, and the oil
industry hampered by the blockade of many external markets, the Mexican economy
appeared irreparably harmed. The Times reproduced a jumble of data that may have
demonstrated an irnmediate crisis, but falsely implied that Mexico could not recover.
Among the many statistics were the following: Mexico has 190 million pesos in
outstanding bank notes and must mint 50 million pesos of silver to meet its domestic
demand; minting capacity is 7 million pesos a month; Mexico exchanged bank notes to get
1 million silver pesos from the Bank of London yesterday; normal silver production is
down by half since the expropriation; gold and silver reserves droppOOby 44 percent since
last August; the government must currently meet a 5.5-million-peso payroll assumed from
the oil companies. All of these figures acted as a prelude to the contention that
indemnification to the oil companies was highly unlikely (Kluckhohn 1938j).
Fiscally irresponsible, "Mexico's enigmatic strong man," as the Times began
identifying Cárdenas, was dragging the country's economy toward socialism at a rapid clip:
[Cárdenas] is committOO to a far Leftist course. There is no telling how far the
regime will go. The government is restricting other such moves at present because
of financial difficulties, but Mexican labor has been officially informOOthat this is
only a temporary check. (Kluckhohn 1938i)
Furthermore, the Times' in-house intellectuals feared a domino effect throughout Latin
America.
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As a result, the safety to the South of the Rio Grande of the $4,500,000,000
(sic) United States capital and about a similar amount of European investments,
mostly British, is left to any political group that may seize the government of any
of these countries. If the Mexican Government is permitted to expropriate the
foreign-owned oil propenies, it is considered likely that Venezuela would be
encouraged 10do the same thing eventually. (CanmcalI938)
By contrast, the economic assessment in the San Antonio Express was far less
hysterical and probably a good deal more accurate. Days after the expropriation, a story
with the headline "Gasoline Supplies in Mexico Ample" stated, "The manifesto by
President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico Friday night expropriating foreign oil companies has
not lessened the availability of gasoline." Likewise, the newspaper said that "Mexican Oil
Supply at Normal, Is Reponed," adding that refineries were operating at their pre-
expropriation levels. When economic instability was reponed, the stories had a calm tone
explaining that "controlled inflation" was being used to ease the "monetary situation
precipitated by expropriation ofthe foreign oil industry" (AP 1938c). Even the decision 10
suspend silver purchases was viewed as having a negligible impact on the Mexican
economy. More important, according to the AP, was the political shift in Washington
represented by the suspension of silver purchases (AP 1938d).
Both newspapers mentioned periodically that the oil expropriation was only the
beginning of a series of industry takeovers. The San Antonio Express downplayed the
likelihood of the extension of expropriation to the mining industry, mentioning "rumors"
on very few occasions (AP 1938a; "Miners Back Cardenas" 1938). TheNew York Times,
however, vinually guaranteed the spread of expropriations and saw the conflict as pan of a
grand scheme of "applying the cardinal point of his six-year plan for the country, the so-
called 'Mexicanization of industry'" (Kluckhohn 1938t).
The foreign petroleum companies operating in Mexico are merely at the
spearhead of a government-supported drive to make other large United States and
British organizations, like mining and electric concerns leave the greater pan of
their income in Mexico. (Kluckhohn 1938a)
Neither newspaper was very adept at predicting the expropriation. They were not
alone in calling the future, as Josephus Daniels deemed the announcement, a "bolt from the
blue," and American oil representative Thomas Armstrong commented hours before the
action that "Cardenas wouldn't dare expropriate us" (Kluckhohn 1938e; Meyer 1972: 343).
Because of heavy reliance on oil company sources, the Times frequently parroted claims
similar to that made by Armstrong. The Times gave prominent display to British
statements that the Mexicans could not afford to expropriate their holdings ("Britons
HopefulOver" 1938). They also claimed that popular suppon of such an action was tepid.
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Already union members in the oilfields are indicating they do not want to work
under the government because they are aware that it could sell petroleum
domestically and that they are more likely to have wage reductions than increases
that way There is always the possibility of force majeure to make President
Cardenas assume control of the companies, observers concede, but the fact that the
government and unions continue to vacillate makes a settlement more likely.
(Kluckhohn 1938b)
Warning signals had been given periodically indicating readiness for an expropriation, but
seldom were Mexican threats reported by the U.S. press, and on those rare occasions when
deelarations were published in the Times, they were located deep in the newspaper
("Mexican Workers Ready" 1938: 22).
Reporting of the expropriation itself was page 1 material in both newspapers and
was reported in a similar manner (Kluckhohn 1938c; AP 1938e). However, one interesting
detail distinguished the two reports and adds a significant point for historical consideration.
According to reports in the New York Times, oil workers had executed a union order to
take possession of the companies' Mexico City headquarters prior to the expropriation
(Kluckhohn 1938c). This action apparently forced Cárdenas either to expropriate the
foreign companies or to move against the Mexican workers.
The reaction of Mexican society overall was briefly mentioned, but usually only
when activities somehow related to Americans. The outpouring of aid across all social
levels, which is usually noted in most historical accounts, was ignored in the Times and
lightly touched on in the final paragraph of a San Antonio Express report (AP 1938c).
Several artieles were written about mass parades, however, usually focusing on the
threatening nature of the activities, manipulation by the government, or the lack of genuine
support behind the large participation.
The Mexico City parade following expropriation received prominent coverage in
both newspapers. The Express called the event a "monster demonstration," directed against
American imperialism; "One cry swept like wildflfe along the five lines of marchers-'one,
two, three-three, two, one: los gringos se van' (the foreigners are getting out)" (AP
1938b). But before the Times covered the parade, they ran a story elaiming that Cárdenas
ordered 20,000 students, ineluding kindergartners, to march from the Monument to the
Revolution to the Presidential Palace (Kluckhohn 1938f). Besides being manipulated, the
crowd, according to the Times, was possibly cornmunistic, definitely unenthusiastic, and
rudelyanti-American.
Except for school children in reds, yellows and pinks, some of whom saluted
with the cornmunist raised fist, it was largely an overalled and denim-elad mass
that streamed through the central streets and raised myriad Mexican flags before
President Cardenas. On the whole, the individual paraders appeared unexcited and
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even spiritless. Few well-dressed persons were to be seen and there were few
spectators. Shops had their iron fronts down. One group marchOOchanting: "One,
two, three, four, down with the Gringos." It was the ftrst time that the derogatory
Mexican word for Americans had been usOOpublic1y for many years. (Kluckhohn
1938h)
Both newspapers carriOOregional stories of the celebrations, where threatening images of
bayonet-wielding soldiers kept at bay the mobs of women who hissed at tourists and
chantOO"Down with the Americans" (AP, NYT 1938).
The U.S. government maintained a fairly low proftle during the expropriation
period, but it was never seen by either newspaper as being supportive of the Mexican
course of action. Both newspapers describOO Washington's initial response to the oil
expropriation as "cool," and notOOthat a stern protest was unlikely (Kluckhohn 1938d; UP
1938b). But it appears that American journalists grew impatient with Washington's pace,
blowing up U.S.-Mexico interactions wherever possible. On March 29, the lead story in
both newspapers dealt with a note delivered to the Mexican foreign minister from Secretary
of State Cordell Hull, specifying "fair, assured and effective compensation" for
expropriated lands (AP 1938e; Kluckhohn 1938k). The contents of the note were never
revealOOto the press; nevertheless, both newspapers called the message forceful, causing
Cárdenas to call an "urgent" session of congress to discuss a l00-million-peso internal
loan.
News Omissions
Several angles on the expropriation story were never covered by Standard Oil, or
by the newspapers studied, but because they are repeatOOly mentioned in historical
accounts, these issues must have been widely known at the time. If the details had been
mentionOOas background material where appropriate, the oil dispute probably would have
been settled sooner. For example, the mechanism that granted wage increases-the
arbitration and conciliation board-was in large part a result of earlier oil company requests
for labor reformo The legal condition of a "conflict of an economic order," the device
forcing arbitration when labor and management perpetually disagreed, was enactOOat the
request of the oil industry as a safety valve to overvaluOOunion contracts (Ashby 1963).
Furthermore, the oil executives supportOOthe idea of a single union to represent workers.
"Lo vieron como algo positiveo, pues estabilizaría las condiciones laborales a pesar de que
presionaría para un alza de salarios" (Meyer 1972: 312).
As wages were frequently mentionOO as being the highest paid in Mexico, the
reporters should have pointOOout that the bulk of the native workers fell in the lowest tiers
of the salary scale. Information widely available before the expropriation documentOOthat
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highly paid positions were given fIrst to the nationals of the operating company, then to
other foreigners, and lastIy to Mexicans (Mexico 1940: 50). AIso important to note was that
the few highly paid jobs favorably skewed the statistics upward, thus reflecting positively
on the oil companies. Furthermore, the workers lived in zones with markedly higher costs
of living, so that when adjusted to consumer prices, their wages were actually lower than
those of railroad workers and miners (Ashby 1963). In addition, oil workers suffered a
decline in purchasing power from 16 to 22 percent from 1934 to 1937 (WeyI1939: 294;
Hamilton 1982: 221). Finally, the newspapers never made the simple and obvious
comparison between the Mexican worker's salary and the wage earned by the American
equivalent. In 1930, the average wage for an unskilled American oil worker was $5.88 a
day. A similar worker in Mexico earned 4.41 pesos a day-Iess than half the American
wage (Mexico 1940: 75 and 190). One company, Gulf Oil, paid comparable salaries in
both countries and avoided expropriation in 1938; yet the newspapers never mentioned this
exception (Townsend 1952).
Both newspapers and the oil companies ignored charges of diversion of funds and
of unethical marketing practices revealed in the government's investigative reporto Hidden
profIts boosted the oil companies' claimed earnings up from 22 million pesos from 1934-
1937, to 50 million during the same period (Ashby 1963). Equally ignored were the
scandalous revelations that the oil companies were marking up product prices by as much
as 350 percent above the world market rate in Mexico and selling at about a 40 percent
discount to Canadian subsidiaries (Hamilton 1982: 221; Townsend 1952: 250). The New
York Times reported that the oil companies had offered 26 million pesos plus back pay on
the day of the expropriation (K1uckhohn 1938c). Yet the reporter never questioned how the
funds were attainable by the companies, which for months claimed that the 26-million-peso
fIgure would put them out of business.
Whereas newspapers frequentIy focused on the calamitous economic ramifIcations
after the expropriation, none of the reports ever mentioned how the U.S. and British
companies were contributing to the crisis. The ensuing devaluation, for example, was
precipitated by sudden capital flight of the oil companies. Furthermore, the oil companies
boycotted Mexican petroleum, attached their ships in European ports, and impeded
equipment sales on a widespread basis (WeyI1939).
Perhaps the most diffIcult area in which to measure omission, however, regards
social services and living conditions. Worker living conditions in the various oil regions
have not been well documented. Standard Oil's claims of social services were largely
substantiated by the Mexican investigative commission. Yet some observers offered
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moving narratives and sweeping statements indicating abject poverty and an absence of
social services.
Tampico is a town that challenges the imagination of a novelist, yet no book could
ever capture more than a fragment of all that this region has meant in sheer human
tragedy. Tampico is the throbbing, relentless reality behind the fight for oil; those
who defend the companies have never walked these streets, never entered a
worker's house, never seen human misery laid bare before their eyes. (Millan
1939:215)
This version, which differs widely from the accounts reponed by alI panies, cannot be
verified or refuted by newspaper repon s because expropriation news was vinually always
dispatched from Mexico City, New York, or Washington.
U.S. Policy and Public Opinion
Since the oil companies never recaptured their assets and were only repaid a fraction
of their original indemnification demands, they obviously lost the fight to reverse the
Mexican expropriation. Moreover, they failed to stir much public emotion over the oil issue
and seem to have alienated severa! officials imponant to the development and execution of
foreign policy.
At the time of the expropriation, the American Institute for Public Opinion, better
known as the Gallup PolI, conducted hundreds of national surveys each year. At the peak
of the publicity of the expropriation, the organization polled national attitudes regarding
weight restrictions on freight trucks, the Olympic Games, profits tax, dirigibles, President
Roosevelt's voter appeal, automobile travel, corporate salaries, government spending,
Democratic presidential candidates, Roosevelt and a third term, and Germany (unedited
listing March 20 to April6, 1938; Gallup 1972: 94). The oil question was not only ignored
at its peak of publicity, it was also omitted from polIs in 1938, 1939, 1940, and 1941. In
December 1938, when the polI asked the nation, "Which (1938) news story do you
consider most interesting?", the responses were: Czech crisis, 23 percent; Nazi
persecutions, 12 percent; Republican gains, 10 percent; Corrigan's flight, 7 percent; wage
and hour bill, 6 percent; New England hurricane, 5 percent; business slump, 5 percent;
World Series, 5 percent; struggle between Japan and China, 4 percent; CIO and AFL
troubles, 4 percent; other, 19 percent (Gallup 1972: 131). Gallup repeated this type of year-
end question in 1939 and again failed to stir the memory of the expropriation.
Although the press was perceived as being able to exen some influence over
Washington policymakers, the pro-American bias in the Times and the oyen propaganda
from Standard Oil did not have much impact on the behavior of key officials. Daniels was
sympathetic to Mexico throughout the expropriation, and frankly resented oil company
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tactics ofpressuring him both directly and via the State Department (Daniels 1947). When
the State Department dashed off an "unduly sharp" note of protest to Mexico, it was
delivered over the objection of Daniels, who suppressed its circulation among the foreign
press (ibid.: 232). Furthermore, after receiving a puzzled response from Mexican Foreign
Minister Eduardo Hay, who thought the expropriation discussions were proceeding
satisfactorily, Daniels told Hay to consider the note never delivered (ibid.). Daniels urged
the companies to settle for payment with oil and suggested that he be allowed to discuss
matters directly with John D. Rockefeller. He wrote to Cordell Hull, c1aiming that the
companies were not negotiating in good faith with the Mexicans, and that by requesting
State Department assistance, the oil giants were acting "in violation of the constitution of
Mexico," which they had agreed to recognize (ibid.: 238).
Generally, Hull was viewed as the most hard-line official in the United States, but
this image was more puff than substance (Hamilton 1982; Meyer 1972). His "forceful"
note to Foreign Minister Hay was, in reality, a lengthy, turgid history of how fair and
democratic the United States had always been in relations with Latin America. The most
forceful part of the note asked, "What specific action with respect to payment for the
properties in question is contemplated by the Mexican Government, and what assurances
will be given that payment will be made, and when such payment may be expected?"
(Daniels 1947: 234). Hull was being lobbied by Standard Oil representatives, and he
considered their position recalcitrant (HulI1948). Eventually, the United States entered into
settlement negotiations without the cooperation of Standard Oil. In dealing with the
company's representatives, Hull set the conflict in an international context and attempted to
de1ineate the rarnifications of the industries' inflexible demands.
I tried to place it on a broader basis by outlining to them the world situation and the
important role Mexico could play in cooperation with uso I stressed the Axis
activities being conducted in Latin America and the help Mexico had already given
us in preventing strategic materials from going to Japan. (Ibid.: 1141)
Like Hull, Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, took an intemational view
when looking at the expropriation issue. "1 took occasion to remark that if bad feelings
should result in Central and South America as a result of the oil situation that exists just
now with Mexico, it would be more expensive for us than the cost of all the oil in Mexico"
(Ickes 1954: 352). By December 1938, Ickes viewed Mexico's economy as being near
bankruptcy; he even alluded to a possible revolution, which he felt was being encouraged
by the oil companies (ibid.: 521). The aggressive position maintained by Standard Oil
apparently sparked panic in some official quarters, which effectively favored a settlement
amenable to the Mexicans.
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Conclusion
The 1938 oil expropriation precipitated a major propaganda campaign by Standard
Dil of New Jersey, which funher intensified similar actions already taken by the Mexican
government. The effon waged by Standard was truly massive, resulting in pamphlets,
weekly news releases translated into Spanish, and books. The company's action reflected
an attitude and operating method it had maintained over the years in dealing with conflicts
in Mexico. Rather than working quietly and compromising with the Mexican government,
the oil company had always stood firm on its demands, using highly publicized negotiating
techniques that forced matters into the public domain. By pushing Mexico to the wall, the
oil company raised the stakes of the original labor conflict to all-or-nothing levels and
eliminated any space within which the government could negotiate. While this tactic
achieved a large degree of success in influencing U.S. news coverage and editorial opinion
on the expropriation, it failed completely when it came to rallying American policyrnakers
to force a retum of the company's assets.
Mexico responded to Standard's publishing program and the avalanche of press
coverage with its own media campaign, which, while not as massive as the oil company's,
was more varied and perhaps more effective. The Mexican government issued a few
publications during the oil conflict, but also used its existing diplomatic agencies to
disseminate its message throughout the United States. The publication of Mexican Labor
News and of Mexico's Oil appears to have had a negligible impact, as their messages were
never quoted in the establishment press. Conversely, the publication of Mexican Labor
News antagonized at least one correspondent who claimed the government was misleading
its people.
More successful was the government's program of using its existing diplomatic
corps 10disseminate information. Documents from the Mexican archives demonstrate that
the diplomatic corps was highly organized; decisions from the center were quickly
dispatched and implemented among all the consulates in the United States. In Mexico City,
the government was geared to take quick action on matters of propaganda. For example,
correspondence from internal agencies received responses from Cárdenas himself
sometimes within 24 hours (Cárdenas AHGE 1940; Suárez 1940). Funhermore, officials
moved in a matter of days to wrap up business in one comer of the country and travel on
extended trips to the United States. Ramón Beteta best exemplified this flexibility and its
rewards. On his trip to Washington and New York, Beteta reponed productive, intimate
meetings with U.S. officials and leaders with whom he forged alliances. Also, his
correspondence clearly reveals a reconceptualization of the functioning of the American
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media and a consequent refonnulation of strategies to combat negative images of Mexico in
the United States.
Newspaper coverage of the expropriation tended to reflect the views of Standard
Oil, both in editorial and news contento The New York Times, normally reserved and
conservative, led the charge against Mexico, speculating on the underlying motives of the
expropriation and demanding finner action on the pan of the State Department. Much of the
reporting from Mexico and all of the stories from New York were heavily dependent on oil
industry sources who received sympathetic treatment by and large. This was probably due
to the individual reporter Frank Kluckhohn who was eventually expelled from Mexico.
Kluckhohn not only told U.S. officials that he personally believed the expropriated
properties should be returned to the companies, but he had established a reputation as a
biased reporter among colleagues in Mexico City (lckes 1954; Plenn 1939).
Despite the large doses of negative coverage given to Mexico by the most powerful
newspaper in the United States, public opinion remained unmoved on the oil expropriation;
the issue simply never assumed a prominent role among current events. And the oil
companies' highly publicized campaign to pressure Mexico probably had an adverse effect
with regard to U.S. officials. At best they were annoyed by the insistence of the
companies; at worst they were alarmed into dealing favorably with Mexico.
Regardless of the many efforts to publicize points of view and to sway public
opinion, other world events ultimately overshadowed the oil expropriation and the interests
of competing factions. Media attention was largely focused on military aggressions in
Western Europe and Asia, which, in turn, seem to have guided public opinion. Oil
company propagandists found themselves competing with a powerful war story that they
could not wipe off the front page of the nation's newspapers. In fact, the number of oil
conflict stories published in the New York Times in 1941 plurnmeted 80 percent compared
to the number of articles printed in the preceding three years. World War II and the fears of
losing Mexico as an ally contributed more than any amount of propaganda to the mellowing
of demands by U.S. officials regarding the expropriation. After hundreds of anicles were
written and reams of paper wasted, events beyond either country's borders emerged as the
decisive factors influencing the settlement ofthe Mexican oil expropriation of 1938.
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